Title: In the Hispanic Institute of Paris, conference about the plan of Spanish development
Duration: 12 min., 24 seg.
Sound collection: Radio Paris. Ramírez/del Campo
Summaries: Entrevista a Ramón Viladás sobre el primer Plan de Desarrollo Español en el Instituto de Estudios Hispánicos de París
During the period 1962-1973, our country experienced a period of economic growth called "the Spanish miracle" for its intensity, insert - must not forget -, in a general framework of European and global expansion. Originally, the Franco regime had tried to develop an alternative economic model to liberal capitalism, based on the search for self-reliance and in a massive state interventionism, as part of the totalitarian project on which the "new state" was based. An economic policy known as autarchy, assumed completely voluntary by the leaders of the dictatorship, which proved disastrous at all levels.
There came a time when the dictatorship, in order to survive as such, needed not only to be properly institutionalized (to leave it all "tied up and well tied up") but also to promote the modernisation and economic liberalization without political concessions, which would be a serious contradiction. Thus, in February 1957 and before the deep economic crisis caused by autarchy, Franco introduced important changes in the leadership of government. Admiral Carrero Blanco and Laureano Lopez Rodo has a special political role. While Rubio and Alberto Navarro Ullastres, two technocrats of the Opus Dei, respectively assumed the Treasury and Commerce portfolios, establishing a series of economic measures that were included in the Stabilization Plan of 1959. Once implanted, a project of sustained economic growth was developed, sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, that imitated the French model of indicative planning: the Development Plans. And along with all this, a propaganda strategy called "opennes" more apparent than real. These elements constitute the beginning of a second stage in the Franco regime: the era of technocratic developmentalism began.
In February 1962, the Commissioner of the Development Plan was created, a body of management, coordination and economic control, led by Laureano Lopez Rodo (right hand Carrero Blanco and de facto leader of technocrats). There were three successive plans, and in all of them the industry was one of the priority sectors: the First Development Plan was in effect from 1964 until 1967, the second, from 1968 to 1971 and the Third, from 1972 to 1975. In summary, six basic objectives were marked: maximum possible economic growth, make the economic system more flexible, more equitable distribution of income; greater sectorial balance; full employment and progressive integration in the world economy. As a result, barriers to private initiative and the internationalization of capital were opened, but without eliminating the strong official interventionism, nor the weight of the public sector. The secondary and third sectors grew spectacularly: Spain was urbanized and industrialized. But the indicative planning (Development Plans) failed largely in its objectives, and a very large trade deficit was generated, only compensated thanks to three important flows of currency: mass tourism, emigration to Europe (processes of which "Radio Paris was giving news), and foreign investment. The 1973 oil crisis put an end to the cycle of European prosperity, and therefore to the Spanish, demonstrating the ineffectiveness of Francoist economic policy, whose official propaganda had been attributing to the dictatorship all the successes, in order to gain support both international and internal.
In short, a decade of economic growth in the face of three decades of economic crisis and stagnation. However, the most important positive consequence of the short years of bonanza was the unleashing of a profound social -and therefore, cultural- transformation, that was at the base of the process of transition to democracy and consolidation of it, very much in spite of the dictatorship. The Franco regime did not bring economic modernization much less, but rather was a brake and a delay to a process begun since before the monarchy of Alfonso XIII.
University of Alicante. University library. Music Library