José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez, Josep E. Peris, Begoña Subiza
PLoS ONE 15(7): e0236058.
Abstract: A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes the way to efficiently connect individuals to a source. Hence the question is how to fairly allocate the total cost among these agents. Our approach, reinterpreting the spanning tree cost allocation as a claims problem defines a simple way to allocate the optimal cost with two main criteria: (1) each individual only pays attention to a few connection costs (the total cost of the optimal network and the cost of connecting himself to the source); and (2) an egalitarian criteria is used to share costs. Then, using claims rules, we define an egalitarian solution so that the total cost is allocated as equally as possible. We show that this solutions could propose allocations outside the core, a counter-intuitive fact whenever cooperation is necessary. Then we propose a modification to get a core selection, obtaining in this case an alternative interpretation of the Folk solution.
Abstract: Minimum cost spanning tree problems have been widely studied in operation research and economic literature. Multi-objective optimal spanning trees provide a more realistic representation of different actual problems. Once an optimal tree is obtained, how to allocate its cost among the agents defines a situation quite different from what we have in the minimum cost spanning tree problems.
In this paper, we analyze a multi-objective problem where the goal is to connect a group of agents to a source with the highest possible quality at the cheapest cost.
We compute optimal networks and propose cost allocations for the total cost of the project. We analyze properties of the proposed solution; in particular, we focus on coalitional stability (core selection), a central concern in the literature on minimum cost spanning tree problems.
In 1950, Nash’s seminal paper introduced the axiomatic approach to the analysis of bargaining situations. Since then, many bargaining solutions have been proposed and axiomatically analyzed.
The fact that agents, when face with a bargaining problem, can come up with different solution concepts (that is, different notions of fairness and equity) was first introduced by van Damme (J Econ Theory 38:78–100, 1986) with the meta-bargaining model. In this paper we present and axiomatically analyze a procedure for solving meta-bargaining problems, which we call Unanimous–Concession. As an example, we show that the Nash solution is the result of the meta-bargaining process we define, when agents have dual egalitarian criteria.
Finally, we compare, from an axiomatic point of view, our proposal with other meta-bargaining procedures.
Resumen/abstract: España recibió uno de los más grandes contingentes migratorios internacionales en los años previos a la recesión económica. El cambio de ciclo podría haber conducido a una intensa salida de los inmigrantes. Sin embargo, utilizando la Encuesta de Población Activa (EPA) se comprueba que esa expulsión en masa no se produce. El trabajo, además, aborda las razones que puede haber detrás de la decisión de los inmigrantes para permanecer en el país, a pesar del empeoramiento de las condiciones del mercado laboral y del deterioro de sus condiciones de vida.